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CANADIAN SIGNAL PIRACY REVISITED IN 
LIGHT OF UNITED STATES RATIFICATION OF 
THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND THE 
BERNE CONVENTION: IS THIS A BLUEPRINT 
FOR GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PROTECTION? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
More than twenty years ago, Marshall McLuhan, a visionary 
Canadian, observed that the world was becoming a "global village" 
due to the homogenizing effect of available electronic technolo-
gies.1 Since his observation, the world has grown increasingly 
smaller through the evolution of technologies, such as satellite 
broadcasting, and as industrialized nations have entered the Infor-
mation Age. 2 Although the world is dominated by fewer images, 
the voracious audience for these images continues to expand on a 
global scale. Resultant electronic piracy of television signals, a re-
cent global problem that is on the rise, owes its impetus to ad-
vances in communications technology.3 
The United States is the world's largest exporter of intellec-
tual property;' an export that generates a trade surplus in excess of 
1.5 billion dollars annually.6 Despite a black bottom line, United 
States intellectual property industries are plagued by sophisticated 
global piracy of their copyrighted products. 6 To date, neither the 
public nor the private sector has found a successful means of end-
ing this piracy despite the use of negotiation and consultation with 
offending nations, international conventions, retaliation and 
linkage, and sophisticated deterrent technology.7 Piracy costs the 
television and film industries approximately 1.5 billion dollars an-
1. See DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, VITAL LINKS: CANA-
DIAN CULTURAL INDUSTRIES 11 (1987) [hereinafter VITAL LINKS]. 
2. See Parker, The Free-Trade Challenge, CAN. F., Feb.-Mar. 1988, at 29, 31. 
3. See Price, International Copyright Protection, Licensing and the Collection and 
Distribution of Royalties in the Satellite Era, in 5 INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE AND CABLE 
TELEVISION RESOURCE MANUAL 86 (1987). 
4. See Leahy, How to Protect Copyright in World Markets, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1988, 
at A31, col. 2. 
5. See Bollier, U.S. to Upgrade Standing in World Copyright Community-Finally, 
CHANNELS, Sept. 1988, at 22. 
6. See id. Sales losses from piracy seriously diminish market values. See id. 
7. See id. Many attempts have been made to resolve the problem, but it is difficult to 
harness or confine this new technology. See id. 
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nually,8 but the cost in foreign sales lost is between six and eight 
billion dollars. 9 
Satellite footprints10 have opened the door both to signal in-
terception by foreign cable systems and retransmission without 
permission from copyright owners. Enforcement of copyright trea-
ties may be moot, because they expressly address hard copy and do 
not apply to transmission of intellectual property via satellites, the 
conduit through which this signal piracy most often occurs.11 For 
example, Canadian cable systems have intercepted American tele-
vision signals carried by satellite or broadcast by border television 
stations for domestic viewers and have then blatantly retransmit-
ted them to Canadian viewers without compensating United States 
copyright holders.12 From the perspective of the United States tel-
evision industry, electronic piracy lessens international demand for 
its product and strongly affects economic remuneration.13 
In 1988, two historic developments occurred which had a di-
rect bearing upon the longstanding signal piracy problem within 
Canada. First, the United States entered into the ground breaking 
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA). 14 Second, the 
United States ratified the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
8. See Copyright Office Seeks to Stem Foreign Losses, BROADCASTING, Oct. 8, 1984, at 
81. 
9. See id. at 82. 
10. See generally UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, PIRACY OF U.S. COPYRIGHTED 
WORKS IN TEN SELECTED COUNTRIES: A REPORT BY THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY ALLIANCE TO THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE 3-4 (Aug. 1985) (Discussing problems 
posed by piracy). Depending on power and positioning, a footprint can be as wide as a 
continent or as narrow as a metropolitan area. It is the earth's surface on which a satellite 
transmission can be received. See also Motion Picture Exporting Association of America, 
Memorandum on the Uses of Satellite Technology 56-61 (1984) [hereinafter MPEAA Memo 
on Satellites]. The size of a footprint is determined by environmental conditions, the receiv-
ing dish and the technical properties of the satellite. Id. 
11. See The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, re-
vised July 24, 1971, 33 U.N.T.S. 218 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; see also Universal 
Copyright Convention, Dec. 6, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S. No. 3324 at 2732, 216 U.N.T.S. 
132 [hereinafter UCC]; The Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carry-
ing Signals Transmitted by Satellite, opened for signature, May 21, 1974, art. I, reprinted 
in 13 l.L.M. 1444, 1447 [hereinafter Brussels Convention]; see infra notes 254-56 and ac-
companying text. 
12. See Foreign "Piracy" of TV Signals Stirs Concern, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1983, at 
Al, col. 6. 
13. See id. 
14. See Rowen, Canadian Pact Opens Way for Other Accords, Wash. Post, Jan. 10, 
1988, at Fl, col. 1. President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney signed the Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement on January 2, 1988, and it went into effect at midnight 
on December 31, 1988. See also Farnsworth, Wide Effect Seen from Trade Pact, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 2, 1989, at 29, col. 6. 
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Artistic and Literary Works.16 
This note will examine the Canadian piracy problem in light 
of these recent developments. Next, it will analyze whether the 
FTA and the Berne Convention can provide an adequate means of 
preventing unauthorized retransmission of United States intellec-
tual property in the future. Finally, this note will consider practi-
cable alternatives, which would alleviate electronic piracy on a 
global scale. This note will conclude that if a practicable remedy 
can be enacted in Canada, then such a remedy could act as a 
blueprint for global implementation. 
II. PIRACY OF COPYRIGHTED SIGNALS 
Within the "global village," Canada is not only one of our clos-
est neighbors, but also our leading trading partner.16 We share a 
common border and language, relative economic stability, and cer-
tain cultural similarities. This commonalty makes Canada a desira-
ble testing ground for measures to solve the signal piracy 
problem.17 
As the number one exporter of intellectual property, the 
United States is the nation most seriously affected by signal piracy 
and the unauthorized retransmission of copyrighted works. 1s Al-
though United States cable operators are compelled to remunerate 
Canadian copyright holders for use of their works,19 there has been 
an evident lack of reciprocity regarding the protection of United 
15. See Motion Picture Association of America, U.S. Accession to the Berne Conven-
tion 1 (1988). The United States acceded to the Berne Convention on November 3, 1988 and 
officially became a member on March 1, 1989. See id. 
16. See Rowen, supra note 14, at F5, col. 1. Canada takes twenty percent of United 
States exports. The United States had $125 billion in bilateral merchandise trade with Can-
ada in 1985, $108 billion in trade with Japan and $108 billion in trade with the European 
Economic Community. See id. 
17. Id. With such crucial similarities and with the proximity of the two nations, this is 
a good place to begin implementing solutions. See id. 
18. See Bollier, supra note 5, at 22. 
19. See Copyright Act, § III, 17 U.S.C. § 50l(c) (1976). Section III of the Copyright Act 
protects broadcast signals with the compulsory licensing system. The CRT collects royalties 
for foreign copyright owners whenever their programs are retransmitted by United States 
cable companies. United States copyright law remunerates Canadian copyright owners for 
use of their works in the United States. Id. § 501(c). But see Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 124 (1983) [hereinafter Fairness Bill Hearing] (finding that under Canadian copyright 
law, signal interception and retransmission of broadcast signals by cable companies was not 
an infringement of copyrighted works carried by the signals. Canadian distribution of for-
eign and domestic copyrighted programming was legal without compensation). 
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States copyrighted works in Canada.2° Clearly, under United 
States copyright law21 and under the Communications Act of 
193422 as amended by the Cable Communications Act of 1984,23 
Canadian interception and retransmission of United States signals 
is illegal and deprives copyright owners of their rights. 24 Prior to 
the FT A, the Canadian government was not willing to address this 
sensitive issue. 26 
Signal piracy gives rise to four specific areas of concern in the 
United States: unauthorized retransmission, tax disincentives dis-
favoring Canadian businesses that advertise on American border 
stations, simultaneous retransmission in western time zones and 
Canadian jurisdiction over United States network programming in 
foreign libel suits. 26 This note will confine its analysis to the first 
two issues. 
20. See Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 19, at 27. Canadian copyright owners earned 
approximately $1.25 million from United States retransmissions of their programming in 
1986. See id. If CRT statutory rates increase, Canadian remuneration will increase. Id. 
United States copyright owners are angry, because Canadian cable companies earn money 
from their products without paying for them. Id. See also Canadian Copyright Problems 
Focus of Hill Hearing, BROADCASTING, Nov. 21, 1983, at 54. Until recently, policy makers did 
not address copyright liability for cable retransmission. Solution Evolving to Canadian 
Copyright Problem, BROADCASTING, May 21, 1984, at 42. Other nations, aware of the situa-
tion between Canada and the United States may follow suit. See Fairness Bill Hearing, 
supra note 19, at 22. 
21. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). Subject to §§ 107 through 118, owners of copy-
rights under this title have the exclusive rights to do and to authorize the following: in the 
case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pic-
tures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly. 
22. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 
u.s.c. § 151) (1934). 
23. See Communications Act of 1934, § 605, amended by Cable Communications Policy 
Act 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 705 (1984)). 
24. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1982). When read with United 
States copyright law provisions, § 605 has been regarded as "adequate implementing legisla-
tion" in the United States. See Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 19, at 32-3. See also 
Copyright Act, § III, 17 U.S.C. § 50l(c). Under § IIl(b) of the Copyright Act, unauthorized 
secondary transmission to the public of a first transmission of a work is an infringement and 
subject to remedies provided in §§ 502-506, 509. Id. § IIl(b). 
25. See Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 19. 
26. See generally National Association of Broadcasters, Broadcast Regulation '88: A 
Mid-Year Report 186 (July 1988) [hereinafter NAB Report]. NBC is now being sued for 
libel by the Prime Minister of the Bahamas, who recognizes it is easier to win libel suits in 
Canada. See id. For an in-depth analysis of the western time zone problem, see W. Potts & 
J. Dunstan, Creeping Cancom: Canadian Distribution of American Television Program-
ming to Alaskan Cable Systems, 7 PACE L. REV. 127 (1986). 
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A. Unauthorized Retransmission 
Canada is the most heavily cabled nation in the "global vil-
lage."27 Penetration is at seventy-five percent nationally.28 Four 
out of five homes are cable ready and three out of five subscribe. 29 
Canada uses satellites to link together its cable systems and to ex-
tend service to virtually the entire population. 30 These satellites 
can also be used to retransmit United States television signals ob-
tained from terrestrial broadcasts, border broadcasts, or United 
States satellite networks. 31 
The first concern relates to Canada's unauthorized retransmis-
sion of United States copyrighted signals. Unauthorized retrans-
mission was sanctioned by the Canadian government because of 
high consumer demand for United States programming and subsi-
dization for the developing cable industry.32 Thus, Canadians be-
lieve that they are allowed to access signals of United States bor-
der stations and premium services. 33 For over three decades, 
Canada ignored its obligation to United States copyright holders 
by its evident approval of this piracy.34 This policy has permitted 
the Canadian cable industry to develop and thrive. 35 
In relation to retransmission, a distinction must be made be-
27. See Broadcasters in Canada Told to Shape Up, BROADCASTING, July 21, 1986, at 42; 
see also T. BALDWIN & D. Mcvov, CABLE COMMUNICATION (2d ed. 1988). 
28. VITAL LINKS, supra note 1, at 61. 
29. Id. at 65. Canadian communities of one hundred residents or more implement local 
broadcasting distribution systems. 
30. See P. Grant & G. Westcott, Copyright and New Technology: The Case of Unau-
thorized Reception From Communications Satellites 4 (Feb. 15, 1985) (unpublished manu-
script from lecture given at Vancouver). Point-to-point communication is a direct link be-
tween a transmitting earth station and receiving station and the signal is weak. In point to 
multi-point, satellites distribute signals to cable head-ends and local television stations for 
network broadcasting. The signal is stronger. A direct broadcast satellite has the strongest 
signal and it transmits it for direct reception. See id. 
31. See id. 
32. See T. BALDWIN & D. Mcvov, supra note 27, at 366. 
33. See Hagelin & Janisch, The Border Broadcasting Dispute in Context, in CULTURES 
IN COLLISION: THE INTERACTION OF U.S. BROADCAST TELEVISION POLICIES 43 (1984). 
34. See P. Grant, Free Trade and the Retransmission of Program Signals: New Devel-
opments in Program Rights, Payment and Protection in Canada Dl (Mar. 25, 1988) (notes 
for presentation to the Law Society of Upper Canada Conference on Canadian Communica-
tions Law and Policy). 
Id. 
35. See id. Peter Grant, a Canadian communications law attorney, has said: 
In 1954, when the Exchequer Court of Canada ruled, simultaneous rediffusion of 
broadcast signals to private homes did not constitute a radio communication to the 
public or a performance in public, the cable industry has since operated under an 
umbrella of immunity from copyright infringement. 
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tween local and distant broadcast signals. 36 Because the majority 
of the Canadian population lives along the United States-Canadian 
border, it has the capacity to receive United States programming 
from off-air local signals.37 Generally, retransmission of local, con-
ventional off-air, broadcast signals is not piracy so long as the sig-
nals remain intact and are not delayed. 38 Both the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) and the Canadian Radio-
Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) use the 
Grade "B" contour, the official contour used for television stations, 
to determine a local signal. 39 This contour establishes the area in 
which there is acceptable reception fifty percent of the time at the 
best fifty percent of receiving locations:'0 Because of this local sig-
nal definition, implementation of the FT A cannot act alone in 
resolving the border broadcaster problem.41 Royalty payments may 
only accrue to retransmission of distant, conventional broadcast 
signals.42 
Piracy occurs when Canadian satellite carriers intercept 
United States border television signals and then retransmit them 
by point to multi-point distribution.43 This method facilitates 
broad distribution.44 With government approval, Canadian Satel-
lite Communications, Inc. (CANCOM), Canada's national satellite 
service, has distributed United States broadcast signals without 
compensating appropriate networks, affiliates, or copyright owners 
for use of the copyrighted programming contained in them.4~ Ini-
36. See id. at D8. Distant signals are outside the B contour and are subject to royalty 
payments. Local signals are within the B contour, and may be received off-air. See also 
NAB Report, supra note 26, at 206. Piracy and redistribution of United States border sig-
nals are also accomplished by terrestrial microwave. Deletion of United States commercials 
and other alterations occur in some instances. See id. 
37. See Cooke, Introduction, in CULTURES IN COLLISION: THE INTERACTION OF U.S. 
BROADCAST TELEVISION POLICIES, supra note 33, at xi. 
38. P. Grant, supra note 34, at D8. In the U.S., signals are exempt if retransmitted by 
cable systems to subscribers in the local service area of primary transmitters. See id. 
39. See id. 
40. See id. 
41. See Letter from Smith, Lyons, Torrance, Stevenson & Mayer to Hillel Gedrich, 
MPEAA Deputy Director Legal Affairs 2 (Oct. 26, 1988) [hereinafter Gedrich Letter] (stat-
ing that economic hardships of local signal definition increase). 
42. See P. Grant, supra note 34, at D8. 
43. See T. BALDWIN & D. Mcvov, supra note 27, at 182; see also P. Grant & G. West-
cott, supra note 30, at 3. 
44. See P. Grant & G. Westcott, supra note 30, at 3. 
45. See Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 19, at 144-45. Canadian cable systems such 
as CANCOM intercepted U.S. broadcast signals for distribution to Canadian viewers, and 
U.S. copyright owners were not remunerated. See also NAB Report, supra note 26. 
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tially, such retransmission was only to remote areas where off-air 
reception was poor; however, urban centers were soon included.46 
CANCOM sells these signals, offering "3 plus 1" service (the 
for profit distribution of ABC, CBC, NBC, and PBS affiliates' pi-
rated signals) to the entire Canadian cable network."' Canadian 
cable systems pay a fee to CANCOM, but they have neither been 
liable for retransmission poached from United States domestic sat-
ellite transmissions nor for retransmission from United States net-
work border affiliates."8 Copyrights of border broadcasters have 
been violated along the entire breadth of the United States-Can-
ada border from Bellingham, Washington, to Presque Isle, Maine, 
and United States "super stations" have also been retransmitted 
without consent. 49 
Commercial and premium channels use satellites to transmit 
television signals to cable system "headends" for redistribution. 50 
These signals are also susceptible to unauthorized reception by in-
dividuals, hotels, and apartment complexes having a satellite dish 
of comparable size to the cable headend dishes. 51 This technology 
resulted in widespread unauthorized reception of competing sig-
nals carrying programming, including Home Box Office, ESPN, 
and the Arts & Entertainment Network, on United States commu-
nication satellites.52 In 1984, approximately seventy-eight thousand 
apartment suites in Canada received these signals through satellite 
master antenna television (MATV) even though copyright holders 
were never compensated. 53 
By 1988, most United States premium signals were encrypted 
and could no longer be poached by satellite dish owners who were 
consequently forced to pay for reception. 54 For a brief time pre-
46. See id. 
47. See Address by M. Berg, Senior Associate General Counsel with the NAB, House of 
Commons (June 21, 1985)(opening statement to the Subcommittee on the Revision of Copy-
right of the Standing Committee on Communications and Culture) [hereinafter Berg Ad-
dress]; see also The Canadian Copyright Problem, BROADCASTING, May 21, 1984, at 42. 
48. See Motion Picture Export Association of America, Memorandum on Canadian 
Trade Barriers § 2, ii 8 (May 1988). 
49. See Berg Address, supra note 47. 
50. See T . BALDWIN & D. Mcvov, supra note 27, at 9 (a headend is the control center at 
which all program sources are received, assembled and processed for transmission by the 
cable distribution network); see also 17 U.S.C. § lll(f) (1982) (definition of cable system); 
see generally M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE (1979). 
51. See P. Grant & G. Westcott, supra note 30, at 4. 
52. See id. at 1, 2; see also T. BALDWIN & D. Mcvov, supra note 27, at 333. 
53. See P. Grant & G. Westcott, supra note 30, at 2. 
54. See T. BALDWIN & D. Mcvov, supra note 27, at 333. 
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mium signals were secure, because decoders were needed to un-
scramble them. By 1987, however, a covert industry in the manu-
facture and sale of contraband decoders had become operative. 55 
This industry manages to keep pace with changes in the encryp-
tion system and is almost impossible to police. 
Illegal decoders are as sophisticated as the technology they de-
code. 56 Paradoxically, they can be purchased in the United States 
for about twenty dollars. The circuitry is modified and then sold 
for 300 dollars in Canada where approximately eighty thousand il-
legal decoders are now in use. 57 These illegal devices cost Canadian 
cable operators fifty million dollars in lost revenue in 1988, 58 not to 
mention the loss to United States premium services. 
United States premium services cannot approve decoders for 
their services in Canada, because they rarely acquire Canadian 
programming pay television rights.H Furthermore, under CRTC li-
cense regulation, Canadian premium services must contribute sub-
stantially to Canadian program development even though their 
services are unmarketable to television receive-only (TVRO) dish 
owners, who illegally intercept United States premium services.60 
The Canadian Criminal Code supports encryption and should, to 
some measure, discourage signal piracy; however, the wide inter-
pretations by lower courts make prosecution uncertain. 61 
B. Canadian Income Tax Legislation 
The second area of United States concern involves the use of 
Canadian income tax legislation as a deterrent to Canadian adver-
tising on United States border broadcasting stations.62 In 1971, the 
CRTC implemented a policy permitting cable licensees to delete 
commercials from signals of television statio~s not licensed to pro-
55. See P. Grant, supra note 34, at Dll. Increasing numbers of "walking descramblers" 
are imported into Canada by people using an illegal United States mail drop. Id. 
56. See GI to Revamp Videocipher II, BROADCASTING, Sept. 5, 1988 at 89. General In-
struments estimates that 319,000 of the 1,012,000 VCils shipped have been altered to allow 
unauthorized reception of satellite-delivered television programming. Id. 
57. See Byrne, West Coast Cable-TV Companies Banding Together to Battle Pirates, 
Globe & Mail, Nov. 2, 1988, at 2, col. 1. 
58. See id. 
59. See P. Grant, supra note 34, at Dll. 
60. See id. The Canadian courts are reluctant to prosecute these pirates. See id. 
61. See id. 
62. See Hagelin & Janisch, The Border Broadcasting Dispute in Context, in CULTURES 
IN COLLISION: THE INTERACTION OF U.S. BROADCAST TELEVISION POLICIES, supra note 33, at 
47. 
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vide service in Canada. 68 The goal was to encourage Canadian ad-
vertising on Canadian programming and to discourage expenditure 
of Canadian advertising dollars on American border stations if the 
same Canadian target audience could be reached through commer-
cial deletion. 64 This policy was originally implemented in Calgary 
and Edmonton, but by 1973 was occurring randomly in the To-
ronto market.H Angry American border broadcasters unsuccess-
fully challenged this practice in the Canadian courts.66 By 1977, 
the CRTC suspended the policy, because it was recognized as an 
ineffective, costly and inappropriate stimulus for advertising on lo-
cal Canadian programming.67 Commercial deletion is only permit-
ted in the Calgary and Edmonton markets and has been 
grandfathered by the FT A. 68 
Equally problematic for American border broadcasters is Bill 
C-58, which amends the Canadian Income Tax Act.69 This corpo-
rate tax provision, which denies business tax deductions to Cana-
dian advertisers on American border stations and was enacted to 
bolster the Canadian broadcast industry as part of Canadian cul-
ture, makes the cost of advertising on American stations one hun-
dred percent higher than it is on Canadian stations. 70 Once again 
the Canadian government's goal was to stimulate increased spend-
ing on domestic productions which would, in turn, seduce Cana-
dian viewing audiences back to Canadian-content programming.71 
A secondary motive was to reduce the outflow of Canadian dollars 
to the American market.72 This amendment is both effective and 
63. See id. 
64. See S. Globerman & A. Vining, Bilateral Cultural Free Trade: The U.S.-Canadian 
Case 8 (1988) (unpublished manuscript available at Simon Fraser University). 
, 65. See generally Hagelin & Janisch, The Border Broadcasting Dispute in Context, in 
CUL TURES IN COLLISION: THE INTERACTION OF U.S. BROADCAST TELEVISION POLICIES, supra 
note 33, at 47. 
66. See Capital Cities Communications, Inc. v. CRTC, 2 S.C.R. 141 (1981). 
67. See Hagelin & Janisch, The Border Broadcasting Dispute in Context, in CULTURES 
IN COLLISION: THE INTERACTION OF U.S. BROADCAST TELEVISION POLICIES, supra note 33, at 
48. 
68. United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100-449, 1988 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 1851. 
69. Bill C-58, An Act to Amend the Income Tax Act, April 18, 1975. "In computing 
income, no deduction shall be made in respect of any otherwise deductible outlay or expense 
of a taxpayer made or incurred after the sanction comes into force, for an advertisement 
directed primarily to a market in Canada and broadcast by a foreign broadcast undertak-
ing." Id. 
70. See NAB Report, supra note 26, at 69. 
71. See S. Globerman & A. Vining, supra note 64, at 9. 
72. See id. 
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strictly enforced. 78 However, the government's primary goal has 
not been achieved, because there is no compulsion or incentive for 
Canadian-owned media to spend resulting windfall profits on the 
production of Canadian content programming. 74 
Moreover, Canadian border stations are hard pressed to turn a 
profit in view of the competition from American border stations, 
the greater interest of Canadian audiences in American program-
ming and the lack of American interest in Canadian program-
ming. 75 Instead, they have used those windfall profits to under-
write operating expenses. 76 As a result, the cost to American border 
stations is as high as twenty million dollars annually in lost adver-
tising revenues. 77 
Numerous negotiations between the United States and Can-
ada on the easing of C-58 have failed to yield an agreement. As a 
result of the failure of these initiatives, the United States govern-
ment was finally compelled to introduce mirror legislation. 78 More-
over, during the 1985 Shamrock Summit, C-58 was a topic of dis-
cussion between former President Ronald Reagan and Prime 
Minister Brian Mulroney.79 Finally, United States trade represent-
atives again raised the issue during FT A negotiations. Except in 
relation to the printing industry, American negotiators have been 
unable to move Canadian negotiators from their intransigence on 
this issue.80 The prospect for repeal of C-58 in relation to Ameri-
can border stations looks bleak; the Canadian position has not al-
tered since its initial implementation and appears to be as firm as 
it is in relation to the culture exemption. 
C. The Canadian Cultural Incentive 
In the information age, intellectual property industries are the 
73. See Law & Regulation, BROADCASTING, at 66-68 (Jan. 30, 1984). Border broadcasters 
suffered a fifty percent loss in Canadian business, because cost of advertising for Canadians 
almost doubled according to this Canadian study. Bill C-58 generated in excess of $28 mil-
lion in revenues for Canadian broadcasters in 1982. See also Chapter IV: Programming and 
Advertising Issues, NAB Report, supra note 26, at 67. 
74. See S. Globerman & A. Vining, supra note 64, at 9. 
75. Telephone interview with Robert Tritt, Director of Trade Policy and Canada/USA 
Telecommunications, Canadian Department of Communications, Canada (Jan. 23, 1989) 
[hereinafter Tritt Interview]. 
76. See id. 
77. See NAB Report, supra note 26, at 69. 
78. See infra text accompanying notes 277-81. 
79. See P. Grant, supra note 34, at Dl. 
80. See NAB Report, supra note 26, at 68; see also Bill C-58, supra note 69. 
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principal conduits for the exchange of ideas; through these indus-
tries, a nation produces and disseminates the cultural products, 
which mold and reflect its society. Canadians are heavy cultural 
product consumers, even though those products are essentially 
American in origin.81 Canada believes that it should seek a more 
equal balance between Canadian and foreign perspectives. 82 As 
Former Communications Minister Flora MacDonald stated, "cul-
ture is the very essence of our national identity. Nourishing that 
identity are the cultural industries, whose institutions ... face long 
odds against success. We want to shorten those odds."83 The cul-
tural sector generates in excess of ten billlion dollars in the Cana-
dian economy and employs over three hundred thousand. 8" 
Currently, CRTC regulation in broadcasting places national 
content viewing at thirty percent. Nonetheless, the actual share of 
audience captured is much lower because of the higher interest in 
American programming.85 The American market is approximately 
ten times greater, because it is possible to reach eighty percent of 
the Canadian population by cable television whereas cable pene-
tration in the United States is about fifty-three percent.86 The dis-
tinction between these percentages becomes even more graphic 
when the size of the Canadian population is compared to the size 
81. VITAL LINKS, supra note 1, at 1. Seventy-six percent of all books are imported; 
ninety-seven percent of films shown are also imported; over ninety percent of dramatic tele-
vision is foreign; eighty-nine percent of revenue from the sound-recording industry accrues 
to twelve foreign controlled firms. See id. 
82. Id. 
83. See VITAL LINKS, supra note 1, at 5; see also Rewriting the Communications Rules 
in Canada, BROADCASTING, Jan. 16, 1989, at 102 [hereinafter Rewriting the Rules]. In the 
policy paper, "Canadian Voices: Canadian Choices," which describes the new Canadian 
broadcasting policy, Ms. MacDonald asserted: 
It is of fundamental importance to our political and cultural sovereignty that our 
broadcasting system be an accurate reflection of who we are, of how we behave, of 
how we view the world. It plays a major role i~ defining our national, regional, local, 
and even our individual identities. It is, therefore, much more than just another 
industry. 
Rewriting the Rules, supra, at 102. 
84. Canada-U.S . Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, COMMONS DEBATES, 
16,892 (June 28, 1988) (address by Flora MacDonald, former Minister of Communications, 
before debate on Bill C-130, which was enacted as C-2, the copyright implementing legisla-
tion). See Rewriting the Rules, supra note 83, at 103. 
85. See Rewriting the Rules, supra note 83, at 103; see also Parker, The Free-Trade 
Challenge, CAN. F., Feb.-Mar. 1988, at 34. The CRTC requires sixty percent daytime and 
fifty percent prime time Canadian programming from television "stations, but reports that 
less than ten percent of prime time English language programming is Canadian. See Parker, 
supra, at 34. 
86. See Parker, supra note 85, at 34. 
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of the American populatfon. 87 
Some commentators have gone so far as to refer to post-indus-
trial Canada as a developing nation in cultural terms, thereby ex-
cusing its protectionist attitude. 88 Because pirated American televi-
sion signals have subsidized the Canadian cable industry with 
Canadian government approval, Canada cannot claim to be pro-
tecting its culture when, for example, over ninety percent of dra-
matic television programming is foreign and, of that percentage, 
seventy-five percent is of American origin.89 Simply put, this is a 
question of economics.9° Canadian producers cannot financially 
compete in the market place with the negligible cost of American 
programming, especially when that programming is abstracted at 
no cost to Canadian cable systems who retransmit it. 91 Further-
more, even when Canadian broadcasters purchase American pro-
gramming, the rates are much lower than those of the Canadian 
cultural producers. 92 
The economics of program production are linked to the sale of 
advertising. 93 Because American programming has greater appeal, 
it generates higher advertising revenues.94 The combination of the 
relatively small Canadian market and the fierce competition for 
American programming in export markets makes production of 
Canadian programs a high risk. 96 The government sought to 
87. See Defining the Accord, MACLEANS, Nov. 21, 1988, at FT6. There are 246 million 
American citizens and only 26 million Canadian citizens. Id. 
88. Address by Ambassador Simon Reisman, Canadian Television and Film Association 
(June 17, 1988) [hereinafter Reisman Address]. Reisman said: 
Id. 
[Film] and television were never the subject of negotiations at my negotiating table. 
. . . This is also true for the cultural industries generally . . . . Canada was not 
prepared to enter into any substantive commitment that would in any way limit our 
freedom to do whatever we considered necessary to further the interests of our cul-
tural industries and to advance our national goals in the realm of cultural activity 
broadly defined. The U.S. side ... [g]ot nowhere and in the end came to accept it 
even though ... [t]hey don't really understand the reasons for it. 
89. VITAL LINKS, supra note 1, at 5. 
90. See id. 
91. See id. 
92. See id. at 63. Imported programming is available at five to ten percent of the cost 
for similar quality Canadian programming. See also Rewriting the Rules, supra note 83, at 
103. Canadian broadcasting rights to one hour of Dallas cost $60,000. One hour of original 
Canadian programming can cost almost $1 million to produce. In 1984, Canadians spent 
ninety-eight percent of tQ.eir viewing time watching foreign dramatic programs despite the 
thirty percent CRTC rule. Id. 
93. VITAL LINKS, supra note 1, at 59. 
94. See id. at 60. 
95. See id. 
12
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strengthen the economic base for Canadian broadcasting with Bill 
C-58,96 which did repatriate Canadian advertising expenditures 
from American border broadcasters. However, this did not achieve 
the goal of increased spending on Canadian programming 
development. 97 
III. THE CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
The present volume of trade and investment between the 
United States and Canada is the largest of any two nations in the 
world. 98 Eighty percent of all Canadian trade is conducted with the 
United States.99 More than half of the capital in Canada is foreign-
owned with United States investment comprising a substantial 
portion of that figure. 10° Furthermore, Canada is the single largest 
importer of United States intellectual property.101 
Canada and the United States exchanged goods and services 
in excess of 160 billion dollars in value in 1987; this figure is ex-
pected to rise as a result of the FT A.102 Following Congressional 
and Parliamentary approval, the FTA, signed by former President 
Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in 1988, came 
into force on January 1, 1989.108 A joint Canada-United States 
trade commission was established to monitor its 
implementation.10" 
Under the FT A, elimination of tariffs and other trade barriers 
over a ten year period will enhance both nations competitiveness 
on an international scale by increasing mutual economic growth, 
lowering prices, and expanding employment.106 Unless terminated 
by either nation upon six months notice, the FT A will remain in 
place indefinitely. However, the agreement may be amended at any 
96. See id. at 61; see also Bill C-58, An Act to Amend the Income Tax Act, April 18, 
1975. 
97. See S. Globerman & A. Vining, supra note 64, at 9. 
98. See U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, DEP'T ST. BuLL., July 1988, at 24 [herein-
after Free Trade Agreement]. 
99. See id. 
100. See Parker, supra note 2, at 29. 
101. See id. 
102. See Free Trade Agreement, supra note 98, at 24. 
103. See Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 29. 
104. See Free Trade Agreement, supra note 98, at 24. There will be a secretariat in 
Ottawa and Washington, D.C., which will be the principal government office responsible for 
implementation. Article 103 obligates Canada to ensure provincial laws and changes will be 
made. See id. 
105. See id. 
13
Weisberg: Canadian Signal Piracy Revisted in Light of United States Ratific
Published by SURFACE, 1989
182 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 16:169 
time by mutual consent.106 The FT A is the most comprehensive 
bilateral trade accord ever entered into by the United States 107 
and its provisions are consistent with the obligations of both na-
tions under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).108 As such, the FTA establishes precedents for similar ne-
gotiations with other nations and promotes global trade 
liberalization. 109 
Although the agreement covers most areas of trade, it grants 
specific exemption to Canadian cultural industries including 
broadcasting, film, and publishing.110 The Canadian cultural indus-
tries, like Bill C-58, proved to be a non-negotiable issue during the 
trade talks. m Nevertheless, if the cultural exemption restrains 
trade, either nation has a "right to redress" under the "notwith-
standing" clause of the FT A and may institute reciprocal commer-
cial measures without resorting to arbitration in the binational 
commission empowered to resolve disputes. 112 
There are four express exceptions within the cultural exemp-
tion.m The first eliminates tariffs on cultural goods such as cas-
settes, film, and records. 114 The second relates to Canadian invest-
ment policies, stating that "[a]ny requirement to sell a foreign-
owned cultural enterprise acquired directly by a United States citi-
zen will be balanced by an offer to purchase the enterprise from 
the United States investor at fair open market value, as deter-
106. See id. 
107. See Rowen, supra note 14, at F8, col. 1. The U.S. has a two year-old free trade 
agreement with Israel, and trade experts speculate there may be one soon with Japan or 
Taiwan. See id. 
108. See Free Trade Agreement, supra note 98, at 24, 25. The FTA reaffirms the 
GATT principle preventing discrimination against imported goods. Id. at 25. 
109. See id. The United States and Canada are promoting the inclusion of goods and 
services in the GATT system. See id. at 24. 
110. See Bow to Culture, MACLEANS, supra note 87, at FT21 [hereinafter Bow to 
Culture]. 
111. See Reisman Address, supra note 88. 
112. Grant, Canadian Communications Law and the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agree-
ment, 6 COMM. LAW. 8 (1988). The "notwithstanding clause" states: 
Id. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, a party may take measures 
of equivalent commercial effect in response to actions that would have been incon-
sistent with this Agreement but for [the cultural industries exemption]. 
113. See International Trade Commission Group, Department of External Affairs, The 
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, ch. 20, art. 2005, at 292 (Nov. 17, 1988) [hereinafter 
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement]. The two governments agreed that with four limited 
exceptions nothing in the FTA affects the ability of either to follow its cultural policies. Id. 
114. See id. ch. 4, art. 401, at 49. 
14
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mined by an independent, impartial assessment."m Under the 
third exception, both nations will provide copyright protection to 
owners of programs broadcast by distant stations and retransmit-
ted by cable companies.116 Furthermore, Canada must amend its 
Copyright Act, providing a retransmission right for copyright own-
ers on a nondiscriminatory basis.117 Once Canadian copyright legis-
lation is implemented, both nations will have the opportunity to 
review outstanding issues. 118 
The fourth exception obligates Canada to repeal the section of 
C-58 that requires that publications be typeset and printed in Can-
ada so that Canadian advertisers may qualify for tax deductions.119 
Thus, Canadian businesses may deduct advertising expenses for 
periodicals printed in the United States, but only if they meet Ca-
nadian content rules and are owned by Canadians.120 
A. United States and Canadian Copyright Law 
Because the United States is currently the most prolific ex-
porter of intellectual property, 121 domestic copyright law developed 
to fulfill the needs of United States copyright owners. 122 Domestic 
copyright law did not evolve in this manner in other nations, be-
cause fewer commercially popular exports have been produced and 
comprehensive copyright protection has not been as critical.123 For 
instance, domestic copyright protection is accomplished in Canada 
by the copyright statute and the CRTC.124 Prior to the FTA, Can-
ada's copyright statute did not give copyright protection to cable 
or satellite retransmissions of distant signals.126 Further, unautho-
115. See id. ch. 16, art. 1607, ii 4 at 237, 238. 
116. See id. ch. 20, art. 2006, at 297, 298. 
117. Id. 
118. See id. art. 2006(1) at 297. 
119. See id. art. 2007, at 299. Canada must repeal printing provisions in § 19(5) of the 
Income Tax Act (amended by Bill C-58, which extended to broadcasters and eliminated an 
exemption for Time and Reader's Digest). The FTA did not change the requirement that 
seventy-five percent of the publication be owned by Canadians and that it be edited and 
published by Canadian residents. Id. 
120. See Bow to Culture, supra note 110, at FT21. 
121. Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 19, at 27. "In the telecommunications 
field-particularly program production-the United States is already the largest copyright 
exporting state." Id. at 17, 18. 
122. See id. 
123. See e.g., id. at 19-22 (comparison of Canadian and United States copyright law). 
See also MPEAA Memo on Satellites, supra note 10, at 56-61. 
124. Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-30 § 1 (1985); MPEAA Memo on Satellites, supra 
note 10, at 56. . 
125. Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-30, § 1; see MPEAA Memo on Satellites, supra note 
15
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rized interception of satellite signals and cable television program-
ming is not addressed in CRTC regulations.126 
Under the 1976 United States Copyright Act and through FCC 
authorization, a cable system's retransmission of a copyrighted 
program is considered to be a public performance. 127 The rights of 
copyright proprietors, who have financial interests in cable redis-
tribution of their works, are limited by the compulsory licensing 
system established in the 1976 Copyright Act and administered by 
the Copyright Royalty Tribunal (CRT).128 Under this system, 
United States cable companies can legally redistribute intellectual 
property so long as they follow the fee schedule established by the 
CRT.12e 
The CRT is comprised of five presidentially-appointed com-
missioners who serve seven year terms.130 Their responsibilities in-
clude the adjustment of royalty rates and the distribution of royal-
ties to copyright owners after a deduction for administrative 
costs.131 As of 1980, royalty rates were to be reevaluated every five 
years.132 If copyright holders have claims regarding non-network 
retransmission of their works, they may file individual or joint 
claims with the CRT.133 The CRT guarantees that copyright hold-
ers are properly compensated for each use of their copyrighted 
work by a United States cable system.134 In addition to the com-
pulsory licensing system, the United States also utilizes voluntary 
licensing.136 Under the voluntary licensing system, cable operators 
may negotiate directly with program owners for the use of program 
carrying signals, including the cable satellite channels of ESPN, 
Home Box Office and the USA Network. Compulsory licensing is 
10, at 56. 
126. MPEAA Memo on Satellites, supra note 10, at 56. 
127. But see M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 8-196-97 (1984). "Perform" in the 
1976 Copyright Act does not adequately encompass retransmission and may not give affirm-
ative statutory protection to copyright owners in secondary transmissions. See id. 
128. 17 U.S.C. § III(c)-(d)(2). 
129. Id. 
130. See T. BALDWIN & D. Mcvoy, supra note 27, at 188. 
131. See id. 
132. See id. 
133. 17 u.s.c. § 801(b)(3). 
134. Id. 
135. See Wolfe, Ruling May Bring Down Cable's Copyright Costs, CABLEVISION, Aug. 
18, 1986, at 57; see also In re Compulsory Copyright License for Cable Retransmission, S. 
Doc. No. 87 FCC, 2 F.C.C. Red. 2387 (1987). Cable systems may negotiate directly with 
copyright owners for retransmission rights, a more costly system allowing the market to 
reflect the value of the copyrighted signals. See id. 
16
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more common. 136 
Although compulsory licensing is binding on domestic cable 
companies, it is not binding on foreign cable systems, because 
United States copyright laws do not have extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion.137 Resale common carriers are not subject to copyright liabil-
ity by virtue of FCC authorization.138 When the FCC ruled that 
resale · common carriers could distribute television signals to global 
markets, it stated that "all individuals are expected to comply with 
all copyright laws and other program requirements. "139 The FCC 
further stated that "the proper forum to raise [copyright] issues 
would be the transborder locations where the programming is re-
ceived. "1•o This raises the issue of international copyright enforce-
ment, and enforcement is dependent upon international copyright 
laws.1•1 
B. The FTA Retransmission Exception 
Of the four exceptions to the cultural exemption under the 
FT A, the retransmission exception is perhaps the most influential. 
The short term benefit is that it compels Canadian broadcasters 
and cable systems to pay for use of intellectual property.u2 The 
136. See Compulsory License, BROADCASTING, Jan. 16, 1989, at 18. The FCC voted in 
1988 to recommend that Congress abolish the compulsory copyright licenses for distant sig-
nals. See also FCC Wants Congress to Dump Compulsory Licenses, BROADCASTING, Oct. 31, 
1988, at 30. 
137. See M. NIMMER, supra note 127, § 17 .02, at 17-5. See also Kirios, Territoriality 
and International Copyright Infringement Actions, 22 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 53 
(1972). 
138. See M. NIMMER, supra note 127; see also 47 U.S.C. §214(a). Under the Communi-
cations Act, the FCC has jurisdiction over common carrier operations. The FCC authorized 
resale technology as a common carrier communications service when it granted the request 
of Southern Satellite Systems, Inc., to operate as a common carrier. Southern Satellite Sys., 
Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 153 (1976). Evaluating the request under the "public interest standard," 
the FCC said: 
Among the many benefits we foresaw from an open entry policy for resale carriers 
was the more efficient utilization of existing communication capacity. This appears 
to be a particular benefit here since SSS's proposal will permit a more efficient utili-
zation of high capacity domestic facilities by carriers with a special expertise in 
certain communications submarkets .... [It] would also result in an increase in the 
diversity of cable television programming available to the public .... 
Id. at 159-60. 
139. Eastern Microwave, Inc., I-P-C-81-049 et al., Mimeo No. 2617, at 37 released Mar. 
1, 1983. 
140. Id. 
141. See id. Because of U.S. ratification of the Berne Convention, it may be easier to 
seek redress provided by the minimum standard rule. See Berne Convention, supra note 11. 
142. Additional net outflow to the United States from retransmission royalties is esti-
17
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long term benefit is that Canada is required to update its copyright 
law in order to implement the retransmission right promised by 
the FT A. 143 The ramifications of this revision could affect all for-
eign intellectual property and ultimately provide compensation to 
foreign copyright holders under the aegis of "national 
treatment. "14" 
Amendments to Canada's Copyright Act, which implement the 
FTA, make unauthorized cable or satellite retransmission of copy-
righted works to the public a liability.146 Under this cultural excep-
tion, copyright owners receive royalties if retransmission of a dis-
tant broadcast signal is unaltered and simultaneous.1" 6 If the 
retransmission is of a local broadcast signal, no remuneration is 
required. 147 Negotiated consent of the copyright owner is needed 
for any other communication to the public.148 For the first time, 
Canadian cable systems will be required to pay royalties for re-
transmitting the distant broadcast signals of United States pre-
mium services and border stations.149 
C. Bill C-2 
Bill C-2 implements the FTA.160 Proclaimed into force by Par-
liament on February 19, 1989, the bill creates a compulsory licens-
ing scheme for distant signal transmissions, as well as a copyright 
royalty tribunal, which establishes the royalty rate. m The bill fur-
ther provides that distant signals are to be defined by CRTC regu-
lation.152 In confidential negotiations prior to FTA passage, Cana-
mated to be in the 100 million dollar range annually. Parker, supra note 85, at 33. 
143. See id. 
144. See National Treatment, MACLEANS, Nov. 21, 1988, at FT7. National treatment is 
a GATT concept that bars discrimination against the goods of other nations. In the FTA, 
both nations agreed not to impose higher internal taxes, more stringent laws, or rigorous 
regulations on foreign goods than on domestic goods. See id. 
145. See Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 113, § 2006(2) at 297. 
146. Id. § 2006(2)(b). 
147. Id. § 2006(3)(a)(ii)(B) at 298. 
148. Id. § 2006(2)(a) at 297. 
149. Id. 
150. See C-130, Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 33d 
Parliament, 2d Sess., §§ 35-36-37 Elizabeth II (1988). C-130 was enacted on February 13, 
1989 as C-2. C-130 includes the amendments that revise the Canada Copyright Act and 
implements Article 2006. See id. See also Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-30 §§ 2 ii 3(1)(f), 3(1), 
28, 48, 50.6 (1985), amended by R.S.C., ch. C-42 (Supp. 4 1988). 
151. See Retransmission Regulations Adopted by Cabinet, COMM. FACT SHEET No. 89-
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dian negotiators assured United States negotiators that the 
definition would be within the grade B contour.163 Nevertheless, 
the definition of local signal was determined as B contour plus 
32Km. 154 This addition is viewed as arising from Canadian Cable 
Television Association pressure and its claim that this definition 
resembles the United States local signal definition.1H The effect is 
to severely reduce the number of so-called distant signals, espe-
cially in the Ontario market, and the amount of royalties, origi-
nally estimated at between 9.1 and 11.2 million dollars, which 
would be generated for United States intellectual property 
industries.156 
B contour plus 32Km does not simulate the United States sys-
tem because the two broadcasting systems are so diverse, especially 
in relation to the border significance.157 The United States defini-
tion does not recognize the border. However, Canadian signals are 
not viewed heavily by American consumers. 158 On the other hand, 
ninety percent of the programming watched by Canadian consum-
ers is American.159 According to Robert Tritt, a director of the Ca-
nadian Department of Communications, the 32Km spill-over from 
the B contour was appended to the local signal definition in order 
to arrive at an equitable definition of distant signal.16° Canada's 
153. See Gedrich Letter, supra note 41. 
154. See Retransmission Regulations, supra note 151, at 3. A signal is considered local 
and exempt from royalty payments when it completely covers a cable system's service area. 
See id. When the coverage is partial, the cable system must pay royalties for coverage of the 
distant part of the service area. See id. 
155. See Gedrich Letter, supra note 41. 
156. Sue-COMMITIEE ON THE REVISION OF COPYRIGHT, STANDING CoMMITIEE ON COMMU-
NICATION AND CULTURE, A CHARTER OF RIGHTS FoR CREATORS 1, 43 (1985). These figures 
represent 1.4% to 1.7% of revenues of cable systems for 1985. 
157. 17 U.S.C. § 501(c). American copyright owners believe a border should not be a 
determinant when their works are retransmitted without authorization. Transborder spill 
over does not release Canadian abstracters from responsibility, especially when Canadian 
copyright owners are compensated by United States broadcasters for retransmission of Ca-
nadian copyrighted works. See id. 
158. See Tritt Interview, supra note 75. 
159. VITAL LINKS, supra note 1, at 62. 
160. See Tritt Interview, supra note 75; see also Retransmission Regulations, supra 
note 151, at 3. By legislation, the Canadian Copyright Board ensures a preferred rate for 
small retransmission systems, which are located in isolated or remote areas and serve one 
thousand households or less. Id. Legislation, defining local and distant signal and small re-
transmission systems, became effective on May 9, 1989. Id. at 1. Cabinet approval of these 
regulations was announced by Canadian Communications Minister Marcel Masse. See Re-
transmission Rights, Communications News Release No. 89-5292E 1 (May 9, 1989); see gen-
erally Letter from Norman Altermann, MPEAA Vice President of Legal Affairs, to Kenneth 
Hepburn, Assistant Deputy Minister, Canadian Department of Communications (April 7, 
1989). Mr. Altermann suggested implementation of the following regulation defining small 
19
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perception of this issue is that United States concern about the 
addition of 32Km is based upon loss of the coveted Ontario 
market. 161 
1. Compulsory Licensing 
Within C-2, the compulsory licensing scheme is specifically 
limited to simultaneous retransmission, but there are two condi-
tions wherein a copyright owner's authorization must be ob-
tained. 162 The first is where the intent of the original transmission 
was not for the general public~ 163 In this instance, a cable system 
would be compelled to contract directly with the rights holder. 164 
Encrypted premium satellite services such as Home Box Office and 
the Arts & Entertainment Channel, which are for cabled homes, fit 
this classification.165 United States treatment is similar under the 
1976 United States Copyright Act.166 The second condition con-
cerns retransmissions of conventional broadcast signals that are in-
tentionally delayed or retransmitted in a changed format. 167 Fur-
ther, there are exceptions to these conditions.168 As of January 1, 
1990, Canadian cable systems will begin paying royalties.169 
retransmission systems for the purpose of subsection 70.64(1) of the Copyright Act as en-
acted by S.C. 1988, c. 65, s. 63: 
Id. 
Small retransmission systems mean cable retransmission systems (other than 
master antenna systems) and terrestrial retransmission systems utilizing Hertzian 
waves that retransmit a signal, with or without a fee, to no more than 1,000 prem-
ises in the same community. 
161. See Tritt Interview, supra note 75. 




166. See Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 113, § lll(b). This section 
excludes secondary transmission of a primary transmission when controlled and limited to 
reception by particular members of the public, such as MUZAK and premium TV signals. 
Under compulsory license, signals may not be altered by the retransmitter. See id. 
167. See Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 113, art. 2006. Exceptions in-
clude blackouts; programs distributed by local network affiliates, transmission of obscene or 
abusive material, transmission during an election, public service announcements, 
grandfathering of commercial deletion in Calgary and Edmonton and retransmission to re-
mote areas where simultaneous reception is impractical. Id. art. 2006(3)(a). A local licensee 
must be allowed to exploit the full commercial value of his license. Id. art. 2006(3)(b). 
168. See id. 
169. Background Note, Provisions Affecting the Cultural Industries in the Canada-
United States Trade Agreement 4 (Jan. 1988). The Regime will apply to retransmission of 
Canadian and United States broadcast signals on a non-discriminatory basis. See id. See 
also O'Neil, Cable and Copyright in Canada: The New Retransmission Right Environment, 
CABLE COMM. MAG., June 1989, at 14. The projected cost in royalties to the Canadian cable 
20
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In the United States, compulsory licenses apply to distant Ca-
nadian signal carriage carried by United States cable systems lo-
cated within 150 miles of the border or north of the forty-second 
parallel.170 Under that scheme, cable systems in, for example, 
Cleveland, Detroit and Seattle would fall under the compulsory li-
censing scheme. Chicago, New York City and San Francisco would 
not. 171 Since the majority of the Canadian population is located 
within 150 miles of the border, it would be considered discrimina-
tory for more distant Canadian cable subscribers not to enjoy the 
benefits of the compulsory · license approach for United States 
broadcast signals.172 This perceived inequity became the founda-
tion for the 32Km addition to the distant signal definition. 173 
Bill C-2 repeals section 3(1)(f) of the Canadian Copyright 
Act.m C-2 addresses MATV systems, which serve multiple unit 
dwellings. m Individuals who occupy units in the same building are 
considered part of the public, and therefore, are entitled to receive 
a communication exclusively intended for transmission to that en-
tity.176 Section 1.3 defines a telecommunications carrier as one who 
merely provides the technology needed by another entity to com-
municate a work to the public.177 This amendment parallels the 
"passive carrier" exemption in the 1976 United States Copyright 
Act.178 As a result of the "passive carrier" rule, United States re-
sale carriers, or "superstations," that uplink conventional televi-
sion station signals to transponders, which deliver them to cable 
systems, are not infringing upon copyrighted works because they 
do not alter the signal.179 In Canada, CANCOM controls both the 
industry is from 15 to 20 million dollars annually. See id. 
170. P. Grant, supra note 34, at 06. 
171. See id. 
172. See id. 
173. See Tritt Interview, supra, note 75. 
174. See C-130, Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 33d 
Parliament, 2d Sess., §§ 35-36-37, 11 62(1) at 46 (enacted as C-2). See also id. § (f). 
175. Id. 11 62(2)(1.2). 
176. Id. See O'Neil, supra note 169, at 15. Under narrow interpretation of the Canadian 
government's definition, urban MATV systems qualify as small retransmission systems and 
are entitled to the preferential royalty rate; however, MATV systems in urban service areas 
of cable licensees serving more than one thousand premises were excluded by an amend-
ment to the definition. Such systems are classified as equivalent to cable systems in whose 
areas they operate. See id. 
177. See C-130, Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 33d 
Parliament, 2d Sess., §§ 35-36-37, 11 62(2)(1.2) (enacted as C-2). 
178. Id. 
179. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § lll(a)(3). This is the "passive carrier" exemption 
where 
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selection and the use of signals it transmits; it would not be con-
sidered a resale carrier by United States definition.180 Nonetheless, 
it would be exempt from liability under the Canadian Copyright 
Act, because CANCOM cable affiliates are responsible for remit-
ting royalty payments for use of program signals181 and also for 
fees payable to CANCOM as the resale carrier.182 
2. Retransmission 
The implementing legislation also includes a section on re-
transmission. 183 That section specifically defines a distant and local 
signal, a retransmitter and signal and retransmission of local sig-
nals. 184 Furthermore, by repealing section 48.52 following subsec-
tion (4), it grants the Copyright Appeals Board the right to estab-
lish parameters for the application for royalty rates for distant 
signals. 186 
Id. 
Section 66.52 substitutes section 48.52 and addresses the func-
the secondary transmission is made by any carrier who has no direct or indirect 
control over the content or selection of the primary transmission or over the partic-
ular recipients of the secondary transmission, and whose activities with respect to 
the secondary transmission consist solely of providing wires, cables, or other com-
munications channels for the use of others .... 
180. See id. See also Copyright Update, 13 CABLE COMMUNIQUE 1, 4 (1989). The CRTC 
has authorized four United States "superstations," WTBS, WPIX, WOR and WGN, for 
cable system carriage in Canada, but these signals cannot be exported because of a United 
States State Department embargo which will be in place until retransmission royalties are 
established and are being paid. Once this is in process, the United States government will 
authorize United States common carriers to export the "superstation" signals. See id. 
181. See C-130, Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 33d 
Parliament, 2d Sess., §§ 35-37, ii 62(2)(1.3)(1.4) (enacted as C-2). 
182. Id. But see Brotman, Cable Television and Copyright: Legislation and the Mar-
ketplace Model, 2 COMM/ENT 477, 481 (1979-80). In the United States, resale common carri-
ers are paid a monthly fee by cable companies receiving the forwarded television signals, 
and fees are based on the companies' average number of monthly subscribers. 
183. See C-130, Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 33d 
Parliament, 2d Sess., §§ 35-37, ii 63 (amending § 28 with § 28.01) (enacted as C-2). 
184. See id. §§ 28.01(1), 28.01(2)(a)-(d), 28.01(3). 
185. See Canada Copyright Act, supra note 124, at§ 48.52 repealed by C-130, Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 33d Parliament, 2d Sess., § 66.52 
(enacted as C-2); see also Copyright Update, 13 CABLE COMMUNIQUE 1 (1989). Eleven copy-
right collectives, acting on behalf of copyright claimants, filed fourteen proposed tarriffs, 
statements of proposed royalties, with the Copyright Board on July 1, 1989, which was the 
filing deadline. See id. The Copyright Board published these tariffs, and, by law, cable licen-
sees were given twenty-eight days to file written objections to the proposed royalties. Cana-
dian Cable Association CEO, Michael Hind Smith, stated that "[t]he copyright collectives 
have filed for two to three times the amount they should receive in the United States and at 
least seven or eight times what Parliament envisioned when it endorsed copyright liability." 
Id. 
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tion of the Board. 186 The new subsection establishes guidelines re-
garding royalties for retransmission, royalty statements, filing and 
time for filing, period of effectiveness, as well as rules for publiciz-
ing approved statements. 187 In addition, they speak to small re-
transmission system exceptions, royalty collection, nonmember 
claims, and proper exclusion of remedies.188 Another establishes 
that the Governor in Council of the Board may vary the date of 
royalty distribution but not their apportionment. 189 
D. The CRTC Role 
The role of the CRTC will continue to be important even after 
copyright revision. CRTC rules on distant signal import will con-
tinue to determine the extent of market exclusivity that can be 
maintained for specific programs.19° Financing of Canadian televi-
sion programs, in particular, will depend on the suppliers' abilities 
to sell the programs based on exclusivity and on market differenti-
ation. 191 The FT A provides that existing measures imposed by the 
FCC or the CRTC will be maintained, and new measures may be 
introduced to enable local licensees of copyrighted programming to 
exploit the commercial value of their licenses.192 Because compul-
sory licensing does not speak to all program rights issues related to 
distant signal importation, both agencies will continue to function 
in maintaining and improving those rights. 193 
Former United States Secretary of the Treasury James Baker 
III perceives the FT A as a "win-win" enterprise.194 Nevertheless, 
the exemption of Canadian cultural industries is of particular con-
cern to the billion dollar United States intellectual property indus-
tries that view the agreement as a "win-lose" enterprise.195 The Ca-
nadian stand is perceived as protectionist, paradoxical and 
186. See C-130, Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 33d 
Parliament, 2<l Sess., § 66.52 (enacted as C-2). 
187. See Canada Copyright Act, supra note 124, at§ 50.6 amended by C-130, Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 33d Parliament, 2d Sess., §§ 
70.6, 70.64(1)(2) (enacted as C-2). 
188. Id. See also Retransmission Regulations, supra note 151, at 3. 
189. Id. 
190. P. Grant, supra note 34, at Dll. 
191. See id. 
192. See Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 113, at art. 2006(3)(b). 
193. See P. Grant, supra note 34. 
194. See Rowen, supra note 14, at F8, col. 1. 
195. See id. These industries had hoped that the FTA would address video cassette 
tape piracy and were disappointed about the local signal definition, etc. See id. 
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confusing.196 The revised Canadian Copyright Act, in conjunction 
with the FT A, has the potential for controlling the unauthorized 
retransmission of intellectual property.197 But its effectiveness for 
the United States and Canadian broadcasting industries has yet to 
be ascertained. 198 
E. Public Sector and Private Sector Positions Regarding the 
FTA 
Several United States agencies and intellectual property in-
dustries have taken specific positions regarding the final provisions 
of the FT A in relation to the cultural exemption.199 These include 
the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB),200 the Motion 
Picture Export Association of America (MPEAA), 201 and the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR).202 The Canadian De-
partment of Communications has taken a position as well. 203 
Since the Canadian legislature passed Bill C-58, the NAB has 
been vehemently opposed to it and has vigorously supported ef-
forts for its repeal.20" The NAB was disappointed that the FTA 
made no provision for repeal of the section of C-58 which it be-
lieves discriminates against the United States border broadcast-
ers.206 It considers the retransmission exception a small concession 
on the part of Canada and has resolved to continue strong opposi-
tion against the unfair treatment accorded border broadcasters 
196. Fairness Bill Hearings, supra note 19, at 144-45. On the one hand, the Canadian 
government seeks ethnocentrism, yet on the other, it ignored piracy to develop the cable 
industry and to quench consumers' thirst for American cultural diffusion. See id. 
197. See Berne Convention, supra note 11; see also UCC, supra note 11. Because of the 
revision, international copyright conventions will come into focus. See id. 
198. See id. 
199. See Telephone Interview with Ben Ivens, Counsel for NAB Legal Dep't, Washing-
ton, D.C. (Jan. 17, 1989) [hereinafter Ivens Interview]; Telephone interview with Mark 
Kalmansohn, Director North American Anti-Piracy Operations, Sherman Oaks, California 
(Jan. 19, 1989) [hereinafter Kalmansohn Interview]; Telephone Interview with Charles Roh, 
Associate General Counsel to the USTR, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23, 1989) [hereinafter Roh 
Interview]; Tritt Interview, supra note 75. The National Association of Broadcasters, The 
Motion Picture Association of America, The United States Trade Representative and the 
Canadian Department of Communications have all worked toward furthering their individ-
ual goals in relation to the FTA. Impressions of the results and ramifications of the negotia-
tions are included in this note with their permission. See id. 
200. See Ivens Interview, supra note 199. 
201. See Kalmansohn Interview, supra note 199. 
202. See Roh Interview, supra note 199. 
203. See Tritt Interview, supra note 75. 
204. See Ivens Interview, supra note 199. 
205. See id. 
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which it believes directly contradicts the spirit of FT A trade bar-
rier elimination. 206 
Although the MPEAA is gratified that the FTA obliges Can-
ada to pass legislation subjecting cable companies to liability for 
unauthori~ed retransmission of distant signals, it is greatly con-
cerned over the addition of 32Km to the B contour.207 This addi-
tion imposes an afflictive restriction on the royalties that can be 
collected for retransmission.208 The MPEAA's belief is that all sig-
nals entering a foreign nation should be deemed distant signals. 209 
The MPEAA position is that Canada should not compare its signal 
definition to the definition the United States has adopted.210 It 
finds such a comparison to be erroneous, because advertising reve-
nues generated by the United States from Canadian signals is mi-
nuscule while the revenues generated in Canada by American sig-
nals is monumental.211 The MPEAA will continue to lobby all 
concerned for an equitable signal definition in the best interest of 
United States copyright owners.212 
The USTR is satisfied with results of its FT A negotiations. 213 
In simplistic terms, trade is barter, the exchange of one commodity 
for another.214 During the exchange process, negotiators must pri-
oritize commodities that are on the table and must sacrifice the 
less significant to gain an accord but still leave room for their fu-
ture negotiation. m The USTR attempted to gain concessions on 
C-58 and sought a broad agreement on intellectual property.216 
The USTR admits to falling short of that objective. However, its 
position is that the FT A is a distinct improvement over the status 
quo.217 Canadian copyright revision and resultant remuneration for 
retransmission in distant signals is far better than brazen abstrac-
tion of all United States signals without any remuneration.218 To 
have aborted the FT A on these grounds in hopes of obtaining the 
perfect accord would have been ludicrous in the opinion of the 
206. See id. 
207. See Kalmansohn Interview, supra note 199. 
208. See id. 
209. See id. 
210. See id. 
211. See id. 
212. See Kalmansohn Interview, supra note 199. 
213. See Roh Interview, supra note 199. 
214. See id. 
215. See id. 
216. See id. 
217. See id. 
218. See Roh Interview, supra note 199. 
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USTR.219 
Relinquishing retransmission was definitely in Canada's inter-
est, as well as in the interest of the United States, because copy-
right holders in both countries feel the effect of piracy.22° Further-
more, Canada simply could not have sustained unauthorized 
retransmission on cultural grounds. 221 Although intellectual prop-
erty has not been designated for further negotiation, the USTR 
has not forgotten and will not ignore the industry's concerns.222 
The USTR .believes that the only way to resolve the border broad-
casting dilemma is to persuade Canada that this specific means of 
culture insulation is not necessary.223 At the moment, that simply 
is not possible. 224 
According to the Canadian Department of Communications, 
copyright revision is modeled on American copyright law, including 
the compulsory licensing scheme.225 It believes that United States 
special interest groups want to dispose of the licensing scheme in 
the United States and would prefer that Canada implement a sys-
tem that provides more adequate compensation in view of the local 
signal definition. 226 
The Canadian position is that the 32Km addition to the B 
contour is equitable and in the spirit of the FT A. 227 The addition 
was adopted because it is needed to give an accurate definition 
that encompasses a signal's total local coverage.228 United States 
special interest groups do not want the 32Km addition because it 
means there will be fewer distant signals and, therefore, less remu-
neration. 229 If Canada considered all foreign signals distant, it 
219. See id. 
220. See Tritt Interview, supra note 75. 
221. See id. 
222. See id. 
223. See id. 
224. See id. 
225. See Tritt Interview, supra note 75. 
226. See id. 
227. See id. 
228. See id. 
229. See id. See also FCC Wants Congress to Dump Compulsory Licenses, BROADCAST-
ING, Oct. 31, 1988, at 29. The FCC will urge the lOlst Congress to abolish all or parts of the 
twelve year-old compulsory copyright license. It believes this has hurt broadcasters and 
cable programmers by permitting cable companies to carry "underpriced" broadcast signals. 
If the licenses were abolished, copyright owners could negotiate licensing arrangements in a 
competitive marketplace instead of being governed by the CRT's predetermined licensing 
system. Id. at 30. The MPEAA believes that § 605 of the Communications Act could be 
strengthened although it could represent "substantial compliance" with the "adequate mea-
sures" requirements of the Brussels Convention. MPEAA Memo on Satellites, supra note 
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would be applying a discriminatory standard. 23° For example, just 
as local Buffalo signals are available in Toronto, Toronto local sig-
nals are available in Buffalo. Whether or not Americans make use 
of them is not of concern. The point is they are equally 
available. 231 
The FTA requires non-discriminatory treatment.232 If Canada 
treated all United States signals as distant, when according to 
United States copyright law they are not, Canada would be apply-
ing a more favorable standard to the United States, and that 
would not be in accord with the FT A. 233 Canadian intent is that its 
copyright law will apply equitably to the signals of both nations. 234 
E. The FTA as a World Class Player 
In bilateral terms, the success of the FT A is of major conse-
quence to the United States.236 On an international scale, however, 
the impact of the FT A has an even greater significance because of 
the precedent it sets in redefining the international order of cul-
tural investments and services.236 The FTA legitimates United 
States attempts to extend free trade principals in those areas on a 
global basis. 237 The premise is that if Canada has approved the 
FT A, it is reasonable to expect that other nations would follow 
suit, because United States penetration into their cultural service 
and investment spheres is at a much lower level than in Canada. 238 
Assuredly, international redefinition of intellectual property 
rights would guarantee a higher rate of return to United States 
intellectual property industries in royalty and patent payments, in 
remuneration to cultural producers, and in motivating revision of 
existing international copyright conventions and trade agreements 
to include technology and cultural forms of information process-
10, at 44. 
230. See MPEAA Memo on Satellites, supra note 10, at 44; see also Canada-U.S. Free 
Trade Agreement, supra note 113. 
231. See Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 113, at art. 2006. 
232. See id. 
233. See id. 
234. See id. 
235. See Bacon, Will North America Follow Europe's Lead?, Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1988, 
at 1, col. 4. The success or failure of the FTA will greatly influence the possibility of enter-
ing into similar agreements with Mexico and perhaps Japan. See id. 
236. See id. 
237. See Free Trade Agreement, supra note 98. 
238. See Rowen, supra note 14, at F8, col. 1. 
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ing. 239 The FT A appears to be a first step toward that end, espe-
cially in terms of signal piracy.240 
For the past two years, United States trade negotiators have 
attempted to liberalize GATT global trading rules to include the 
cultural services and investment areas, and in the Uruguay Round 
of negotiations, the United States and Canada are working to-
gether to expand GATT coverage to include those areas.241 FTA 
ratification and implementation should be a motivating factor in 
these negotiations and should also encourage global trade liberali-
zation.242 United States chief GATT negotiator, James Baker III, 
stated that "the United States-Canadian agreement is a lever to 
achieve more open trade; .... nations are forced to recognize that 
the United States will devise ways to expand trade with or without 
them."243 
As a move toward economic harmonization in North America, 
the FTA is even weightier.244 During the 1988 presidential cam-
paign, President Bush suggested a North American Compact to 
open trade between Canada, Mexico and the United States.246 Be-
cause this prospect appeals to both political factions, the evolution 
of a North American Common Market could materialize in the fu-
ture.246 Canada is resource rich but population poor.247 Mexico is 
debt-ridden, has an abundance of oil, but is an over-populated de-
veloping nation in need of investment and technology to spur eco-
nomic growth. 248 The United States needs resources, workers and 
more markets for its exports.249 The North American population is 
at 355 million. 260 This is ten percent larger than the European 
community, which is moving toward economic integration in 
1992. 261 If the FT A is successfully implemented and works well, 
the face of North America will be forever altered. 262 In the future, 
239. See id. 
240. See Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 113. 
241. See Free Trade Agreement, supra note 98. 
242. See id. 
243. See Rowen, supra note 14, at F8, col. 1. 
244. See Bacon, supra note 235, at 1. 
245. See id. Both economies will be improved by this agreement. See id. 
246. See id. Republicans and Democrats recognize the power inherent in this type of an 
agreement. 
247. See id. 
248. See Bacon, supra note 235, at 1. 
249. See id. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
252. See id. Economic integration will resemble that of the EEC. 
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if a North American free trade area becomes a reality, Canada, 
Mexico and the United States would emerge as a unified influen-
tial force in the global economic arena. 263 
IV. fOTENTIAL REMEDIES FOR UNAUTHORIZED COPYRIGHTED 
SIGNAL RETRANSMISSION 
Although there are no simple answers to the signal piracy 
problem on an international scale, a workable solution may evolve 
in applying one or more of the following measures: international 
copyright treaties in conjunction with bilateral trade accords that 
implement copyright revisions, retaliatory mirror legislation, or 
criminal prosecution for the sale or possession of illegal decoders. 
A. The Berne Convention 
The United States and Canada are signatories to both major 
international copyright agreements, the Berne Convention26" and 
the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC).266 Although the 
United States is a signatory to the only international agreement 
that specifically refers to satellites, the Convention Relating to the 
Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Sat-
ellite (Brussels Satellite Convention), Canada is not a signatory.266 
On October 31, 1988, the United States became the seventy-
seventh signatory to the Berne Convention. m That Convention 
253. See id. By virtue of the combined population and the combined resources, prod-
ucts, and size, the bargaining and buying power of Canada, Mexico, and the United States 
would be the strongest in the "global village." See id. 
254. See Berne Convention, supra note 11; see also E. PLOMAN & L. HAMILTON, COPY-
RIGHT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 49-54 (1980). 
255. See UCC, supra note 11; see also UCC, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.l.A.S. No. 
7868 reprinted in UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, Item B (1971). 
There is no minimum level of protection for foreign copyright holders. If a nation has no 
copyright laws which specifically address redistribution of copyrighted signals, then a U.S. 
copyright holder will not have enforceable rights against piracy. Canada recognizes the 1952 
text and was not obligated to give "national treatment" prior to its copyright revision. See 
also E. PLOMAN & L. HAMILTON, supra note 254, at 57-61. See generally David, Basic Princi-
ples of International Copyright, 21 BuLL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 1 (1974). 
256. See Brussels Convention, supra note 11. For non-copyright protection against mis-
use of private satellite signals, this convention does not apply to signals intended for the 
general public or retransmissions by authorized recipients. The property transmitted in sig- · 
nals is unprotected. Signatories may exclude cable operations from treaty provisions which 
depend on regulation according to each signatory's standard. A signatory may take defini-
tive action to counter signal piracy and has autonomy in determining appropriate copyright 
law. See id. 
257. See MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, .supra note 15. The Senate resolu-
tion ratifying the Berne Convention, H.R. 462, was signed by President Reagan on Oct. 31, 
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provides specific protection to copyright owners of artistic and lit-
erary works, as well as protection to the authors of these works.268 
In addition, it grants authors the exclusive right to communicate 
their works to the public through broadcasting or any other 
means.259 The Berne Convention further permits signatories to im-
plement compulsory copyright licenses relating to telecommunica-
tions.260 Any and all sanctions follow national legislation.261 Na-
tions that are signatories to the Berne Convention, must provide 
foreign authors with the same treatment that they afford their na-
tionals.262 Under Berne, signatories are also bound by minimum 
mandatory rights, which state that foreign copyright owners must 
receive a minimum level of protection regardless of the protection 
that nationals are afforded. 263 
Despite this rule, controversy exists over the applicability of 
the Berne Convention to satellite telecommunications. 264 For some 
time, there has been a debate over whether cable retransmission of 
copyrighted television broadcast signals violates Article llbis, 
which pertains to broadcasts. 266 Some experts maintain the literal 
language of Berne precludes finding liability.266 Those concerned 
about copyright owners' economic rights believe that liability may 
1988. 
258. Berne Convention, supra note 11, at arts. 1, 2, 14bis. 
259. Id. art. llbis. The primary importance of the Berne Convention is that it is the 
only international treaty that expressly grants rights to authors instead of only protecting 
against unauthorized use of their copyrighted works. Id. art. 1. See MPEAA Memo on Satel-
lites, supra note 10, at 48. 
Id. 
260. Berne Convention, supra note 11, at art. llbis. 
261. Id. art. 36. 
262. Id. art. 5(1). This article states: 
Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are protected under this 
convention, in countries of the Union other than the country of origin, the rights 
which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well 
as the rights specially granted by this Convention. 
263. See id. arts. 2.2bis, 7(4) (examples of regulations). 
264. Berne Convention, supra note 11, at art. llbis. This article addresses broadcasting 
and communications by "wireless diffusion of signs, sounds or images" but does not refer to 
satellite communications. In the industry, it is argued that relevancy to satellites can be 
inferred. See id. See also MPEAA Memo on Satellites, supra note 10, at 47. 
265. Berne Convention, supra note 11, at art. llbis. Id. 
266. See, e.g., Dittrich, Cable Television and Copyright Problems, 15-16 W.l.P.O. 26, 
28-31 (1979-89) (Insisting that "communication to the public," exempts cable systems from 
liability, because transmissions are to select subscribers and not off-air). See also Szilagyi, 
Questions of Broadcasting by Satellite with Special Reference to Authors' Rights, 17 COPY-
RIGHT 222 (1981) (discussing the meaning of "communication to the public" in relation to 
satellite broadcasts). 
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be found within the ambit of Article llbis.267 Two European cases 
have dealt with this problem.268 
In its present state, the Berne Convention does not protect 
against signal piracy unless a nation has ratified at least the 1948 
Brussels revision, which expanded Article llbis.269 For example, 
Canada is only a signatory to the 1928 revision, which does not 
address retransmission by cable. 270 Such protection is inferred in 
Article 11 bis of the 1948 revision. 271 In view of Canadian cable sys-
tems' abstraction of American border broadcasting and premium 
television signals, it appears that Canada exempted itself from any 
obligation to United States copyright holders, because it was not 
liable under the 1928 Berne revision prior to its copyright 
revision. 272 
Furthermore, no mm1mum treatment level exists under the 
UCC, and signal protection is not available under the 1952 accord 
267. See, e.g., Walter, Diffusion by Wire in the Copyright Law of the Federal Republic 
of Germany and of Austria, with Particular Reference to the Rediffusion of Broadcasts, 12 
W.l.P.O. 279, 281-83 (1976). See generally Working Group on the Problems in the Field of 
Copyright and So-Called Neighboring Rights Raised by the Distribution of Television 
Programmes by Cable, 13 W.l.P.O. 246 (1977). 
268. Coditel SA v. Cine Vog Films SA, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 833. The Court of 
Justice of the European Communities found: 
The owner of the copyright in a film, and his assigns, have a legitimate right to 
expect that their revenue will be based on a certain number of performances in a set 
geographic area. 
The owner of a copyright in a film has a legitimate right in authorizing a televi-
sion showing of his work only after it has appeared in movie theatres for a set pe-
riod of time. 
The rules of the EEC treaty relating to freedom to provide ser\fices do not pre-
clude a copyright owner or his assignee from contractually limiting the geographic 
limits of the performance. 
Id. at 833. See also Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Stichting tot Exploitatae Centrale 
Antenne-Inrichting Amstelveen, Supreme Court of the Netherlands, Case No. 11.739 (1981), 
reprinted in MPEAA Press Release, Jan. 18, 1982 (cable systems must now obtain permis-
sion by contract prior to retransmission of copyrighted works). 
269. See S. RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND 
ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986 § 3.1, at 81, 81-125 (1987). 
270. The United Kingdom gave notice for Canada on January 1, 1924. Id. § 3.22, at 98 
& n.108. The 1928 text of Article llbis speaks only to public performance and does not 
address specific methods of communication to the public. Id. See also § 3.43. Article 
llbis(l)(i) was extended to include television broadcasts, retransmissions, and transmissions 
to the public. It states: "(i) the public performance of their works, including such public 
performance by any means or process." Id. 
271. Id. §§ 8.74-8.88, at 435-53. Under Article llbis(l)(ii), "authors may authorize any 
communication to the public ... by rebroadcasting of the broadcast of the work, where this 
is done by an organization other than the original one." Id. 
272. See S. RICKETSON, supra note 269, at 98. 
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to which Canada has acceded. 273 Finally, Canada is not a signatory 
to the Brussels Satellite Convention. 274 Thus, Canada had no ac-
countability to the United States until it signed the FTA, which 
obligated it to implement its copyright act that enables the "na-
tional treatment,, aspect of the Berne Convention and the UCC. 276 
This same defect applies to other nations that have not changed 
their copyright laws. 
B. Retaliatory Remedies 
At the present time, the United States can invoke retaliatory 
action against discriminatory foreign practices that injure its ex-
port of goods or services.276 In 1976, the United States began retali-
ation against Bill C-58 by enacting mirror legislation,277 which in-
cluded non-deduction of convention expenses in Canada,278 
273. UCC, art. I, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.l.A.S. No. 7868 reprinted in 
UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, Item B (1971). The protection 
outlined in the UCC is available to an American author regardless of where the work is first 
published. The requisite for protection is the requirement that the symbol (c), the name of 
the copyright owner, and the year of first publication appear. Id. art. 111(1). The UCC was 
revised in 1971 in Paris. At that time, Article IVbis was added. Canada did not accede to the 
1971 revision and it is evident that it did not regard signal retransmissions as protected 
works. Id. art. IVbis(l). 
274. Brussels Convention, supra note 11. Adopted in 1974, this Convention has been 
ratified by only nine nations. See also Price, supra note 3, at 93 (Requirement that each 
nation takes measures to prevent distribution on or from its territory of program carrying 
signals by a distributor for whom it is not intended). See also E. PLOMAN & L. HAMILTON, 
supra note 254, at 82 (stating that one of the key problems for Brussels Convention drafters 
was to work out the "balance between the rights of broadcasting organizations and rights of 
contributors to programming; i.e., authors, performers and other holders of rights"); Szil-
agyi, supra note 266, at 223 (states that background to the Brussels Convention suggests 
that drafters were mainly concerned with the economic interests of the broadcasting organi-
zations and their right to exclusive control over programming transmitted by satellite). 
275. See Berne Convention, supra note 11, at art. 5(1). See also Smith, Should the 
Motion Picture Industry Support or Oppose U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention?, 10 
ENT/SPORTS L. 19 n.5 (1987)(stating that the 1952 UCC does not include art. 1Vbis(2). which 
can be construed to address broadcasting). 
276. See D. STEGER, A CONCISE GUIDE TO THE CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENT 93 (1988)(stating that this right is established under § 301 of the Trade Act of 
1974). 
277. See Hagelin & Janisch, The Border Broadcasting Dispute in Context, in CUL-
TURES IN COLLISION: THE INTERACTION OF U.S. BROADCAST TELEVISION POLICIES, supra note 
33, at 50-55. Various mirror legislation bills were introduced. However, Canada remained 
firm. See id. 
278. Id. at 53. As Andrew Stoller stated: 
Linkage of U.S. action on para. 602 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 with Canadian 
action on C-58 ... severely restricted income tax deductions by U.S. taxpayers for 
the costs of attending conventions outside the United States, and its enactment was 
said to have cost Canadian businesses hundreds of millions of dollars in lost 
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possible FCC limitation on Canadian investments in United States 
cable systems,279 tax restrictions for advertising on Canadian sta-
tions, 280 and a restriction on the Telidon videotext import. 281 
In addition, Congress passed different versions of H.R. 3, the 
1987 Omnibus Trade Bill, which extensively altered United States 
trade laws.282 The cumulative effect is to facilitate obtaining im-
port relief for United States industries.283 These bills will transfer 
authority from the President to the United States Trade Repre-
sentative (USTR), who will then make the determinations regard-
ing offending issues. 284 Mandatory retaliation is provided against 
nations that consistently indicate a pattern of import barriers such 
as Japan.286 These bills also define 'actionable acts and practices, 
for example, "export targeting," and allow shortened time periods 
for discussions on taking action. 286 By limiting presidential discre-
revenues. 
Id. 
279. See A Bill to Amend the Constitution Act of 1934, S. 2172, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1982). This solution was proposed by Senator Barry Goldwater, but the concept had been 
rejected by the FCC in 1980. Id. at 55. 
280. See NAB Report, supra note 26, at 67, 68. Legislation sponsored by Senator John 
Danforth (R-Mo.) in 1984 was amended to section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1954, by the 98th Congress, denying tax deductions to United States advertisers for com-
mercials placed on foreign stations in nations whose tax laws resemble C-58. Id. The amend-
ment states: 
Id. 
§ 232(j)(l) In General. No deduction shall be allowed ... for any expenses of an 
advertisement carried by a foreign broadcast undertaking and directed primarily to 
a market in the United States. This paragraph shall apply only to foreign broadcast 
undertakings located in a country which denies a similar deduction for the cost of 
advertising directed primarily to a market in a foreign country when placed with a 
United States undertaking. 
§ 232(j)(2) Broadcast Undertaking. For purposes of ii 1, the term broadcast un-
dertaking includes (but is not limited to) radio and television stations. (b) The 
amendment made to subsection (a) shall apply to taxable years beginning after the 
date of enactment of this Act. 
281. See A Bill to Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to Deny the Deduction 
for Amounts Paid or Incurred for Certain Advertisements Carried by Certain Foreign 
Broadcast Undertakings, S. 2051, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). This bill was amended by the 
addition of § 280 E which created an "Expanded Mirror Bill." Added by Senator Patrick 
Moynihan, the amendment denied tax deductions and credit for the purchases of Canadian 
videotext technology. Id. at 54. 
282. See D. STEGER, supra note 276, at 92. 
283. See id. at 96. Ambassador Simon Reisman believes the enactment of either bill 
would impair the benefits and objectives of the FTA. See id. 
284. See id. at 93, 94. Changes to § 301 of the 197 4 Trade Act will protect and promote 
United States industries rather than just settle disputes. 
285. See id. This would be enforced against nations with an established pattern of im-
port restrictions. 
286. See id. at 93. Foreign policies or practices denying "national treatment" to goods, 
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tion and by requiring mandatory action in specific instances, Con-
gress hopes to make Section 301 more responsive to United States 
industry needs.287 If these changes are implemented, it is reasona-
ble to expect that there will be more investigations and retaliatory 
actions instituted within shorter time frames. 288 
The Omnibus Bill would also amend Section 337 of the Tariff 
Act of 1930, which authorizes the International Trade Commission 
(ITC) to exclude foreign imports that violate intellectual property 
or antitrust laws that injure United States industries.289 The bill 
contains amendments that would eliminate the injury requirement 
in cases involving intellectual property rights. 290 Actions brought 
under this section are more expeditious than court actions because 
the ITC must complete its investigation within an eighteen month 
period while court actions take several years. 291 
For aggrieved intellectual property industries, relief from un-
fair foreign trade practices is available under the appropriate sec-
tions of the 1974 Trade Act and the Tariff Act of 1930.292 By 
amending the pertinent sections, Congress gives these industries 
powerful legislative ammunition with which to counter piracy of 
intellectual property in foreign nations. 293 It is possible, however, 
that Canada will be exempted from the Omnibus Trade Bill, be-
cause in the future, such problems will be addressed bilaterally 
under the dispute settlement provisions of the FT A. 294 In any 
event, other nations certainly will not be exempt, and in United 
States dealings with those nations, the intellectual property indus-
tries will continue to have a powerful friend in Congress.295 
services, or investments become actionable in the Senate bill. 
287. See id. at 94. 
288. If § 301 is amended, the intellectual property indu~tries can expect less bureau-
cracy when redressing their grievances. 
289 . . See id. at 94. The ITC can order offending entities to curtail their unfair trade 
practices. 
290. Id. Both bills also expand the definition of a United States industry, i.e. coverage 
for intellectual property will include trade secrets and common law trademarks. Id. 
291 See id. ITC action would vastly accelerate import relief because of the legislated 
time frame. There are no specific time frames in court actions. See id. 
292. See Trade Act of 1974, § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 15201 (1982) (used to implement Article 
XIX of the GATT where a domestic industry is endangered); Tariff Act of 1930, § 337, 19 
U.S.C. § 1001 (1958) (empowering the ITC to ban imports that impair an established, well 
run intellectual property industry). 
293. See generally, D. STEGER, supra note 276. Retaliatory action available in appropri-
ate legislation should act as a disincentive to international signal piracy. See id. 
294. See Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 113, at ch. 18, art. 1805. 
295. See D. STEGER, supra note 276. Congress is making a serious attempt to address 
the intellectual property industry's problems, because it recognizes its importance to U.S. 
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C. Direct Action Against "High-Tech Pirates" 
In the 1970s, the Canadian Parliament redrafted Section 
287(1)(b) of the Criminal Code to include telecommunications and 
broadly defined it to cover services provided by wire or cable.296 
Two provisions specifically apply to theft of telecommunications 
services.297 Section 287.1 makes possession, sale, or use of a de-
coder without payment for a telecommunications service a punish-
able offense. 298 A violation of this section is punishable for up to 
two years. 299 
Although some relief is possible under these sections, amend-
ments to the Criminal Code, and further judicial definition, inter-
pretation, and enforcement may be required to enhance reme-
dies. 300 In 1984, the United States addressed this same problem by 
amending the Communications Act of 1934.301 Because Canadian 
copyright revision focuses directly on retransmission of distant sig-
nals and not on reception, no liability is imputed to equipment 
vendors of illegal decoders. 302 But, because Canada recognizes 
piracy as a criminal act in its own laws, some relief will be imputed 
to United States television signals under "national treatment," as 
provided in the Berne Convention and the UCC, when Canadian 
copyright revision is complete. 303 
If the United States and Canada combine efforts to prosecute 
trade. See id. 
296. See Brief for MacLean-Hunter Cable TV Ltd. 17; Memorandum Concerning § 287 
of the Criminal Code (1988) [hereinafter Criminal Code Memo]. Under § 287(1)(b), anyone 
who uses a telecommunications service fraudulently, commits theft. Under § 287(2), tele-
communications means any reception or transmission of signals by electronic or magnetic 
system. Under § 287.1(1), anyone who illegally sells, manufactures, or distributes a device to . 
obtain signal reception without payment for telecommunication services is liable to impris-
onment for two years. Under § 287.1(2), such devices are confiscated and may be destroyed. 
See id. 
297. See id. 
298. Id. § 287.1. 
299. Id. § 287.1(1). 
300. See Criminal Code Memo, supra note 296. 
301. See Communications Act of 1934 § 705 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605). In the United 
States, vendors and users of unauthorized decoders can be prosecuted. See also Letter from 
FCC Chairman Dennis Patrick to United States Attorney General Edwin Meese (May 1988) 
[hereinafter FCC Letter]. Criminal actions are prosecuted by the Department of Justice 
under the discretion of local United States Attorneys after FBI or local police investigations. 
The FCC provides technical assistance. Various prosecutions are brought by the state au-
thorities under state theft of services statutes. See id. 
302. See C-130, Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 33d 
Parliament, 2d Sess., § 18.1 (enacted as C-2); see also P. Grant, supra note 34. 
303. See P. Grant, supra note 34; see also Claridge, Two Rulings May Spur Crackdown 
on Sale of Pay-TV Descramblers, Globe & Mail, Jan. 3, 1989, at 1, col. 4. 
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offenders under the domestic laws of both nations, the manufac-
ture, illegal import, subsequent sale, and use of these unauthorized 
decoders would be frustrated. 30" This could cripple satellite signal 
piracy in both nations.306 During the summer of 1988, United 
States federal law enforcement officers began a crackdown on sat-
ellite dealers in Indiana, Montana, New York, Oklahoma and 
Texas who trafficked in illegal decoders such as VideoCipher II. 306 
Moreover, the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted the first 
legal search of a satellite consumer's home and seized illegal 
descrambling equipment. 307 Although there were no arrests in 
those investigations, indictments may be handed down following 
analysis of the decoder units. 308 Because the import and export of 
restricted communications technology is illegal, both United States 
customs officials and the Canadian Customs Service are involved in 
apprehending pirates.309 United States violators face criminal 
charges and fines; Canadian violators face prosecution under the 
Criminal Code. 310 If successful, · such direct action could motivate 
other nations to implement similar enforcement policies against 
piracy. 
Whatever remedy the United States intellectual property in-
dustries apply-whether international conventions in league with 
the FT A, specific domestic mirror legislation, or reciprocity be-
tween the United States and Canada in penalizing sellers and con-
sumers of illegal communications technology under respective 
criminal codes and through a bilateral tribunal-as a result of the 
FT A, there is now a viable means of signal piracy control in Can-
ada. 311 Determination of the most effective method will certainly 
produce strong debate among the affected United States intellec-
tual property industries before enactment of the most helpful 
remedy.312 
304. See id. If each nation does its share in convicting offenders and in upholding and 
enforcing stiff penalties, the risks would outdistance the gains from these illegal acts. See id. 
305. See FCC Letter, supra note 301. 
306. See Buckman, Feds Crack Down on Illegal Descramblers, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, 
Aug. 1988, at 1, col. 3. 
307. See id. See also FCC Letter, supra note 301. 
308. See Criminal Code Memo, supra note 296, at 17. 
309. See Buckman, supra note 306. 
310. See Pirates Nabbed at Canadian Border, Hollywood Rep., Oct. 5, 1988, at 19, col. 
3. 
311. Any of these remedies will have a positive anti-piracy effect and, if enforced, could 
neutralize or even eliminate the problem. 
312. These industries must act uniformly against piracy once they agree upon the best 
remedy. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
It is likely that the FT A will act as a blueprint for accords 
with other nations, not only regarding bilateral trade, but also in 
the struggle for adequate intellectual property protection and com-
pensation. Canada's recognition of copyright in distant signals will 
set a standard for other nations, and may fortify the United States 
position on signal piracy in the Caribbean Basin nations and in 
Mexico. · 
Canada's copyright revision will strengthen and enhance the 
value of international copyright conventions by validating their 
"national treatment" provisions and making them functional. In 
addition, the revision could motivate other nations to take similar 
initiatives in their copyright laws. The best way of eliminating 
piracy of intellectual property is through the coordinated use of 
properly amended copyright laws and international copyright con-
ventions that have also been revised to meet advanced technology 
requirements. The FT A should prove to be a giant step toward eq-
uitable treatment on an international scale and should act as an 
inspiration to and throughout the "global village." 
Nancy R. Weisberg 
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